Koblitz curves belong to a special class of binary curves on which the scalar multiplication can be computed very efficiently. For this reason, they are suitable candidates for implementations on low-end processors. However, such devices are often vulnerable to side channel attacks. In this paper, we propose a new countermeasure against side channel attacks on Koblitz curves, which utilizes a fixed-pattern recoding to defeat simple power analysis. We show that in practical cases, the recoding can be performed from left to right, and can be easily stored or even randomly generated.
Introduction
Since they have been proposed, elliptic curve cryptosystems (ECC) have been thoroughly studied, because in contrary to RSA-type cryptosystems, they are well-suited for implementations on memory-constrained devices and lowend processors. However, when no coprocessor is available to speed-up modular multiplications, elliptic curves defined over prime fields are too slow for practical implementations on such low-end processors. One possible solution is to use elliptic curves defined over binary fields: such binary curves rely on simple and carry-less operations such as shift and xor. Indeed, binary curves can be implemented easily on general-purpose processors, and on some architectures, the simplicity of their atomic operations results in a considerable speed-up compared to elliptic curves defined over prime fields.
But some special binary curves called Koblitz curves are even faster. On Koblitz curves, with an appropriate representation of the scalar, it becomes possible to replace elliptic point doublings by a much faster operation: the Frobenius map. Since their efficient arithmetic has been pointed out [12] , no significant security flaw or practical attack has be found on Koblitz curves. † † The author is with Future University -Hakodate, Hakodateshi, 041-8655 Japan.
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a) E-mail: camille@sdl.hitachi.co.jp b) E-mail: ka-okeya@sdl.hitachi.co.jp c) E-mail: takagi@fun.ac.jp DOI: 10.1093/ietfec/e89-a. 5.1362 Side channel attacks are powerful attacks which use a priori innocuous information such as timings or power consumption to break implementations of cryptosystems [11] . On light and specialized cryptodevices such as smartcards, side channel attacks are a major threat. Side channel attacks are not limited to timing, EM or power consumption analysis, but also include fault attacks, where the attacker introduces transient or permanent faults in the cryptosystem [4] . There are two types of attack strategies based power consumption analysis: simple power analysis (SPA) and differential power analysis (DPA). In the frame of SPA, the attacker uses only one power trace to guess the secret information, whereas he is allowed to use a statistical tool in order to extract information from several power traces in the frame of DPA [11] .
Side channel and fault attacks have been successfully mounted on elliptic curve cryptosystems [1] , [4] , [7] , and countermeasures have been proposed. On Koblitz curves, the standard DPA countermeasures can be deployed: among others, randomized projective coordinates, randomized scalar or randomized base point [7] . However, SPA resistance is problematic: the known countermeasures for general curves are either based on dummy operations [3] , [7] or scalar recoding using properties of binary representations [16] . First, even though dummy-based countermeasures are straight-forwardly applicable, they should be avoided, because fault attacks can exploit dummy operations * * , with devastating consequences [21] . Second, to benefit from the fast arithmetic of Koblitz curves, that is, replacing slow elliptic doublings by fast squares, one has to first recode the scalar to a new representation. On general curves, scalars are usually represented using a binary representation or a close variant. However, on Koblitz curves, the basis of the representation is not 2 but τ, solution of a quadratic equation. As a consequence, many methods relying on the manipulation of binary representations are not applicable anymore.
In this paper, we analyze a novel countermeasure against side channel attacks on Koblitz curves. First, we propose a zerofree recoding method for τ expansions. The scalar multiplication associated to this representation is SPA-resistant thanks to a fixed operation pattern. Second, we explain how to take advantage of more pre-computations and memory with a zerofree window method, and consider-ably decrease the computational cost of the scalar multiplication. Then, we emphasize interesting properties of our scheme. On elliptic curves, left-to-right computations are usually faster, because they are compatible with the most efficient coordinate systems [5] . Thus, it is preferable to use a left-to-right recoding approach as well: the recoding and the scalar multiplication can be combined, and no memory is needed to store the scalar in multiple representations. We show practical situations where our idea is compatible with a left-to-right recoding. When the scalar is fixed (e.g. ECElGamal decryption), using our representation, the scalar can be recoded (off-line) and stored once for all, and a window technique can be applied on-the-fly, from left to right. When a secret ephemeral is needed (in EC-DSA signature generation or EC-DH), we show how to generate random zerofree ephemerals on-the-fly, allowing left-to-right computation strategies to work in harmony with the recoding stage. Therefore, in all practical situations where SPA-resistance is needed, our countermeasure can be deployed to protect secret information against side channel attacks, providing a high security level, great efficiency, smart and small memory usage.
Preliminaries
In this section, we discuss known facts: we introduce Koblitz curves and discuss the feasibility of side channel attacks on them.
Koblitz Curves
Koblitz curves are binary elliptic curves which offer a very efficient arithmetic with no significant security drawback [12] . They are defined over a binary field F 2 m by the equation: E a = y 2 + xy = x 3 + ax 2 + 1, where a ∈ {0, 1}. We denote by E a (F 2 m ) the additive group of the points of the elliptic curve over F 2 m , along with the point of infinity O, neutral element of the addition law, and #E a (F 2 m ), or simply #E a the number of points on the curve. The main interest of Koblitz curves is that elliptic point doublings can be replaced by the efficiently computable Frobenius automorphism Φ : (x, y) → (x 2 , y 2 ). Since the quadratic equation (x 4 , y 4 ) + 2(x, y) = µ(x 2 , y 2 ) where µ = (−1) 1−a holds for all points on the curve, the Frobenius map can be regarded as τ = (µ + √ −7)/2, solution of the equation Φ 2 = µΦ − 2. The Lucas sequence U w is useful to compute with powers of τ:
The approach for fast computations over Koblitz curves is to convert a scalar d to a radix τ expansion such as
. However, in order to fully take advantage of the Frobenius map, the τ expansion must be sparse and short. In [20] , Solinas proposed two efficient algorithms to satisfy these properties: partial reduction modulo δ = (τ m − 1)/(τ − 1) and radix-τ NAF recoding. Additionally, a width w radix τ NAF expansion (TNAF w ) can be constructed from the following map:
where t w = 2
w and the notation mods 2 w refers to the signed representatives modulo 2 w . Interestingly, the elements u 0 + u 1 · τ with odd u 0 correspond exactly to the odd representatives modulo 2 w under Φ w . Thus, the map Φ w defines (easily computable) congruence classes in the ring Z[τ]. Then, the digits of the TNAF w are computed with the procedure described in Algorithm 1. 
Since the digits u of the TNAF w belong to the set u ∈ {±1, ±3, . . . , ±(2 w−1 − 1)}, only 2 w−2 − 1 non-trivial points must be pre-computed, with 2 w−2 − 1 point additions and one point doubling. Therefore, the total cost of the scalar multiplication using TNAF w is on average:
where ECFRB, ECADD and ECDBL stand for the computational cost of the Frobenius map, point additions and point doublings, respectively.
Side Channel Attacks
Side channel attacks are a serious threat for light embedded devices running cryptographic applications: such devices often leak critical information through unexpected and a priori innocuous channels: timings or power consumption, for instance [11] . One can classify side channel attacks relying on power analysis into two categories [11] . The first class of attacks is called simple power analysis (SPA): in this situation, the attacker attempts to reveal the secret parameter with one single power trace. The second class is called differential power analysis (DPA): the attacker is allowed to gather several power traces and analyzes them with the help of a statistical tool. In general, SPA on ECC utilizes the fact that point additions and doublings have different implementations, leading to different power traces [7] . By recognizing the operation chain from the power consumption, the attacker can reveal the secret information. To implement Koblitz curves, a polynomial basis is generally preferred. In this case, point doublings are replaced by the Frobenius map, which has a small but not negligible computational cost [9] . In other words, it is realistic to expect that the computation of one single Frobenius operation can be detected within one power trace: in this case, SPA is straight-forwardly applicable.
In [7] , Coron extended DPA to elliptic curve cryptosystems. On the one hand, DPA is not applicable to EC-DSA, where the base point is fixed and public, and the scalar is a random ephemeral, different for each signature: on the contrary, the settings of DPA require a fixed scalar and variable base points. On the other hand, the scalar multiplications in EC-ElGamal decryption can be attacked by DPA. Therefore, depending on the situation, DPA resistance is not always required. When necessary, the standard DPA countermeasures such as randomized projective coordinates, randomized scalar or randomized base point have to be deployed [7] , [15] .
Another class of attacks closely related to side-channel attacks consists in injecting faults during computations, for instance by feeding the power supply with higher voltage. Then, by analyzing the output of the cryptosystem, the attacker can sometimes recover critical information about the secret parameters [1] , [2] , [4] . A simple countermeasure would be to discard faulty results. However, if the fault affects a dummy operation, the result is not faulty: with these safe-error fault attacks, it becomes possible to detect dummy operations [21] . As a consequence, it is preferable to avoid dummy operations in practical implementations.
Proposed SPA-Resistant Technique
In the following, we describe our SPA-resistant method on Koblitz curves.
Motivation
Since standard DPA countermeasures such as randomized projective coordinates are straight-forwardly applicable on Koblitz curves, achieving DPA resistance is not a major problem. Moreover, depending on applications, DPA attacks are not always applicable: for instance, the signature scheme EC-DSA is immune to such attacks. On the other hand, SPA is always applicable and the countermeasures for general curves do not take advantage of the complex multiplication, which is the key of the efficiency on Koblitz curves.
Currently, there is no scalar multiplication scheme on Koblitz curves which is (1) efficient, (2) resistant to SPA attacks, (3) flexible, (4) free from dummy operations. By efficient, we refer to an acceptable overhead in terms of memory and computational cost compared to unprotected scalar multiplication schemes. Thus, the countermeasure has to make use of the fast arithmetic of Koblitz curves (i.e. replacing point doublings by the Frobenius map). Our SPA attack model assumes that the attacker is able to distinguish individual τ multiplications. Hence, we consider the standard case of a software implementation using a polynomial basis. By flexible, we mean here that a window method can be deployed, allowing trade-offs between memory consumption and computational cost. Finally, we avoid dummy operations since they are vulnerable to safe-errors attacks [21] .
Zerofree Recoding
The TNAF recoding algorithm recursively computes
We play a different approach, and compute a different representative
Note how our technique is inspired by the SPA-resistant NAF w on classical curves [16] . Proposition 1 describes the idea in more general settings. With w = 1, it is equivalent to our previous statement.
Proposition 1.
Let the map Ψ w be defined as:
w . Moreover, by property of the Lucas sequence U n , we have t w − t w+1 = 0 mod 2 w . It follows that
As a consequence, Ψ w can be used to generate SPAresistant TNAF w expansions in a similar manner to the SPA-resistant NAF w on general curves. However, the SPAresistant TNAF w has several drawbacks. First, the recoding step must be computed separately and prior to the scalar multiplication. In other words, it is not possible to recode the scalar on the fly. Second, from the SPA-resistant TNAF w 1 with parameter w 1 , there is no way to directly deduce the representation with w 2 w 1 : the window size cannot be flexibly modified. Therefore, rather than the general case, we restrict the algorithm to w = 1, where the representation becomes zerofree, that is,
It remains to evaluate the length of such zerofree expansions.
Proposition 2. The length of the zerofree expansion generated by Algorithm 2 with input
Proof. It can be verified that if its input has norm smaller than 6, Algorithm 2 terminates after one iteration at most, 
) (see [20] ). In that case, when the number of iterations in Algorithm 2 is i ≥ m + a − 4.13, or since i is an integer, when i ≥ m + a − 4, then N(γ i ) ≤ 6. Therefore, the maximal length of zerofree expansions generated by Algorithm 2 is m + a − 4 + 2, taking the two last digits into account.
In the following, we call l = m + a − 2 the length of zerofree expansions.
Windowed Zerofree Scalar Multiplication
From the zerofree representation, the scalar multiplication could be directly computed. However, such a method would have a high computational cost: one point addition per bit. But if the 2 w−1 points (τ w−1 ± τ w−2 ± . . . ± τ ± 1)P are pre-computed, the zerofree scalar multiplication can be enhanced to a window method, reducing the computational cost to about 1/w point addition per bit. 
Efficiency: Note that in Algorithm 3, the number of digits is not necessarily divisible by w. Unfortunately, the precomputed points (τ w−1 P ± + . . . ± τ)P cannot be used for the last window if its width is shorter than w. In that case, the algorithm simply uses the base point P (corresponding to w = 1) instead of the pre-computed points, as illustrated in Table 1 . Therefore, the computational cost of the scalar multiplication (excluding pre-computations) is:
Security: Based on the zerofree recoding (Algorithm 2), Algorithm 3 protects the scalar multiplication on Koblitz curves against SPA.
Proposition 3 (τ-SPA resistance). The ability to distinguish individual τ multiplications and point additions in power traces confers no advantage for finding the scalar in Algorithm 3.
Proof. The main loop of Algorithm 3 is τ-SPA resistant because the scalar representation has a fixed pattern. Additionally, the scalar multiplication scheme requires that the input ρ is not divisible by τ. If it is, one can add 1 to ρ, and adjust the result of the scalar multiplication by subtracting P. When ρ is not divisible by τ, then τ is added to ρ, and after computing the scalar multiplication, τP is subtracted Q = (ρ+τ)P to make the two patterns indistinguishable.
It follows that our scheme is τ-SPA resistant, that is, assuming strong abilities for the attacker, who is able to distinguish individual τ multiplications. In fact, in our attack model, the information arisen from SPA is of no use for attackers.
Pre-Computations for the Zerofree Method
The scalar multiplication based on the zerofree representation requires that the points (τ w−1 ± . . . ± τ ± 1)P are precomputed. There are 2 w−1 such points; however, one can make use of the symmetry of signs in order to pre-compute them. For instance, for w = 2, the pre-computed points are τP + P and τP − P, and both of the point addition and the point subtraction involve the same points. In affine coordinates, some operations can be eliminated. More precisely, if the cost of one point addition (or subtraction) is 2M + S + I, where M, S and I stand for the cost of field multiplications, squares and inversions, respectively, then the cost of the joint computation point additions subtractions is ECJAS = 4M + 2S + I, saving one inversion. Figure 1 illustrates the general idea of the precomputation technique for the zerofree method: the partial results from given widths w are re-combined using joint additions-subtractions in order to obtain the pre-computed points for a larger width: for example, for w = 4, one computes all combinations for τ 2 (τP ± P) ± (τP ± P), where the points τP ± P come from pre-computations for w = 2. Similarly, the pre-computed points for w = 5 can be computed from the combination of those for w = 2 and w = 3.
SPA-res. NAF
With this approach, the cost of pre-computations for practical widths is as follows (w = 1 is free because only P is needed):
where ECJAS stands for the cost of joint additionssubtractions. We re-inject the cost of elliptic operations in the latter equation and obtain Table 2 , which compares the pre-computations for the SPA-resistant NAF w (on general curves) and the zerofree method (on Koblitz curves). On the one hand, in the zerofree method, field inversions are traded for multiplications and squares; in typical implementations of binary fields, the pre-computations of the zerofree method will be significantly faster than those of the SPA-resistant NAF w . On the other hand, the SPA-resistant NAF w needs 2m bits less memory because unlike the zerofree method, it has one trivial pre-computed point, namely P.
Applications and Comparisons
We describe applications of our technique in the frame of standard ECC protocols, and show how it compares to other schemes.
Applications
SPA-resistance is needed only when secret data is handled. Therefore, public computations do not require SPAresistance. On the other hand, it is critical in the frame of EC-ElGamal decryption or of EC-DSA signature generation. But in these protocols, the involved scalar multiplications are special: in EC-ElGamal, the scalar is fixed, whereas is EC-DSA signature generation, it is a random secret ephemeral. In the following, we explain the advantages of our method in these two situations.
Fixed Scalar: When the scalar is fixed, the recoding work can be pre-processed off-line, that is, once for all during the initialization of the smartcard. In particular, instead of storing the integer value of the secret key, one can reduce it modulo δ, or even recode it off-line to the zerofree representation † . Storing the zerofree representation yields several advantages when the scalar is fixed. First, the representation is compact: about m bits are needed to store it. Second, from the zerofree representation, a window method can be applied online to take advantage of pre-computations, and the width w can be chosen in the runtime. Moreover, the window recoding can be performed on-the-fly, from left to right, without additional memory to store the scalar in the width w representation.
Secret Ephemerals:
In many cryptographic protocols, a random ephemeral is needed. Since the knowledge of the ephemeral generally allows to recover the secret key, it is important to protect the related scalar multiplications against SPA. One can always generate a random integer multiplier, reduce it modulo δ, convert it to an SPA-resistant representation and finally perform the scalar multiplication. However, it is preferable to directly generate a random SPAresistant representation, and even better, to generate the successive digits of the representation on-the-fly, from left to right. Additionally, since the integer value of the random multiplier is often needed along with the multiplied point (in EC-DSA signature generation, for instance), the integer value of the random SPA-resistant representation should be computed without excessive overhead.
The zerofree method can be modified for generating random points along with the corresponding multiplier. From w random bits, the coefficients of the windowed zerofree representation are generated on-the-fly, from left to right. To compute the integer value of the multiplier, we † In this case, randomizing the scalar is not an option to defeat DPA since the recoding is fixed. But other countermeasures such as randomized coordinates or randomized base point are still available [7] . simply reverse Algorithm 2, using only additions, shifts, and one final integer multiplication with τ. Since Algorithm 2 is right-to-left, its reversed counterpart is left-to-right, and can also be executed on-the-fly.
Proposition 4. The distribution of random integers k generated by Algorithm 4 is close to the uniform distribution: its statistical distance to the uniform distribution
with
Proof. For any random variable X, we have:
|E[e 2π iX #Ea ]| 2 (see [10] for a proof), where denotes the complex √ −1 and i is used as index. Since the width w has no influence on the value of k, we consider the distribution of binary zerofree chains (that is, with digits {±1}). Because all bits of the zerofree expansion We extrapolated the value of the sum from a small number of terms in Table 3 . According to our numerical experimentations for several bitlengths m and 8192 random values of i, the statistical distance seems smaller than 2 −m/5 : writing ∆(k) ≈ 2 −m/α , the experimental value of α seems to decrease as m grows, which tends to show that our conjecture is reasonable.
Comparison with Known Methods
Fast scalar multiplication on Koblitz curves: The fastest scalar multiplication on Koblitz curves is the TNAF w [9] . Roughly speaking, for the same memory consumption, the (insecure) TNAF w utilizes a window size w + 2 where our technique has w. This is the price to pay to achieve SPA resistance. Note that when Koblitz curves are implemented with a normal basis, or when change-of-basis matrices are available, it is possible to considerably reduce the memory needed for the TNAF w [18] . Our approach is different: we do not use the TNAF w but a new representation with a fixed pattern. The benefit of this representation is immunity to SPA, but the drawback is a penalty in speed.
SPA-resistant methods:
Side-channel atomicity is a generic approach to defeat simple power analysis [3] . However, the concept of side-channel atomicity implicitly assumes that implementation details normally not considered by cryptographers are managed at the design level. Additionally, side-channel atomicity makes extensive use of dummy operations, which are typical targets for safe-error attacks [21] .
SPA countermeasures on binary curves, such as the Montgomery ladder [14] , are also applicable to Koblitz curves. Even though the Montgomery ladder does not take advantage of the Frobenius map on Koblitz curves, it has a low computational cost, provides SPA-resistance with memory for only two points. On the one hand, when memory resources are extremely scarce, the Montgomery ladder performs better than the zerofree method. On the other hand, when some memory is available for pre-computed tables, as soon as w = 2, our technique largely outperforms the Montgomery ladder.
In a normal basis, the operation τ w P is a simple cyclic shift of the coordinates of P. Thus, the time for computing τ w P is independent from w, and therefore, the position of nonzero digits is concealed in the TNAF w [19] . However, the method leaks the number of nonzero digits of the TNAF w representation. This problem can be partially fixed by introducing additional dummy operations, at the expense of efficiency and security against safe-error attacks. Note that under some circumstances, and in particular w = 4, the short-memory method for Koblitz curves offers some resistance to SCA [18] : the order of computation can be random- ized and the method also uses normal basis squares to hide the position of nonzero digits. However, this approach has the same problems as the change-of-basis method [19] .
Secret ephemerals and compact encoding:
The Frobenius can be utilized to increase the entropy of standard generators on Koblitz curves [6] . While this idea leads to a very efficient scalar multiplication, our scheme has several advantages: it is SPA-resistant, and the same pre-computed table can be used for signature generation and verification. Additionally, it has been shown that the NAF 2 has a compact encoding [10] , and as a consequence, random NAF 2 (and TNAF 2 ) expansions can be easily generated from random bits. Unfortunately, larger widths have not been discussed, and the method cannot be straight-forwardly extended to w > 2. On Koblitz curves, the computation cost of the scalar multiplication can be drastically reduced with a greater w. Besides, the straight-forward implementation of the TNAF 2 is vulnerable to SPA.
Comparison for E(F 2 163 ): Table 4 compares the estimated computational costs and memory requirements of several methods for 163-bit binary and Koblitz curves. We express computational costs in field multiplications (M), with the following hypothesis for squares and inversions: S ≈ M/7, and I ≈ 8M, according to standard timings from the literature [9] . Elliptic operations are computed in LD coordinates for the scalar multiplication and affine coordinates for precomputations. The Montgomery ladder is computed with projective coordinates. Memory requirements take accumulators and pre-computed points into account.
In practical smartcard implementations, we can expect about 500 bytes RAM to be allocated for cryptography: the zerofree method with w = 4 can perfectly run on such platform, achieving a 2-fold speed-up compared to the Montgomery ladder. Moreover, the width w can be chosen in the runtime, therefore, our method can dynamically adapt small-memory or large-memory profiles. Compared to the TNAF 5 , the zerofree method with w = 4 is expected to be about 25% slower, but with SPA-resistance in return.
Conclusion
We presented a new scalar multiplication method on Koblitz curves: the windowed zerofree method. Our scheme is efficient, SPA-resistant, allows high control on memory usage, and is free from dummy operations. Additionally, we proposed practical applications of our countermeasure, such as fixed-scalar and random ephemeral multiplication schemes. In these cases, the windowed zerofree method can be optimized: the recoding stage can be performed from left to right, and combined with the evaluation stage, further reducing memory consumption.
Therefore, in all practical cases where protection against SPA matters, our countermeasure offers a high security level on Koblitz curves, with low memory requirements and small computational cost.
